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Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch:
50 Years of Relevance
Jonathan G. Blattmachr & Madeline J. Rivlin*
Does a state court determination of property rights control, for federal estate tax purposes, when the government was not a party to the
state court proceeding? That was the issue before the Supreme Court in
Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch.1
In the 1930s, Herman Bosch created a revocable trust giving his
wife all income for life, and a general testamentary power of appointment. At that time, there was no estate tax marital deduction.2 It became available for decedents who died after the enactment of the Tax
Reform Act of 1948 but generally only for outright transfers or transfers
to a trust from which the surviving spouse had an annual right to income
and a general power of appointment (in favor of the surviving spouse or
his or her estate) exercisable alone and in all events.3
In 1951, Mrs. Bosch executed an instrument purporting to release
the general power and make it a non-general one. In 1957, Mr. Bosch
died, and his estate claimed an estate tax marital deduction for the trust.
* © 2016. Jonathan G. Blattmachr is director of estate planning for Peak Trust
Company (formerly Alaska Trust Company) and a director of Pioneer Wealth Partners,
LLC, a boutique wealth advisor firm in Manhattan. He is a retired member of Milbank,
Tweed, Hadley & McCloy and of the Alaska, California and New York bars. He is the
author or co-author of eight books and over 500 articles, and has been chair of several
committees of the New York and American Bar Associations and the American College
of Trust and Estate Counsel. He is co-developer of Wealth Transfer Planning, a computerized system for lawyers that automatically generates estate planning documents, such
as Wills and trusts, and provides specific client advice using a form of artificial intelligence. Madeline J. Rivlin is the Project Coordinator for the Zeekbeek online legal marketplace. She is also an Adjunct Professor teaching Federal Estate and Gift Tax and
Estate Planning at Elisabeth Haub School of Law at Pace University in White Plains,
New York.
1 387 U.S. 456 (1967).
2 Bosch was decided together with Second National Bank of New Haven v. United
States, 351 F.2d 489 (2d Cir. 1965). There, the probate court construed decedent’s Will to
throw estate tax onto the non-marital trust. The United States District Court, while stating that the probate court ruling was not binding, agreed with its application of state law.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, interpreting the Will
under state law to charge part of the tax to the marital trust (thereby reducing the estate
tax marital deduction).
3 Revenue Act of 1948, ch. 158, pt. 1, § 361(e)(1)(F), 62 Stat. 110, 117-118 (1948).
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The deduction was denied because Mrs. Bosch lacked a general power,4
and the case went to the United States Tax Court. While the Tax Court
proceeding was pending, the estate successfully petitioned the New
York Supreme Court (a trial court) to rule that Mrs. Bosch’s release was
invalid so that she had a general power,5 as required to qualify the trust
for the marital deduction.
Pre-Bosch, federal courts struggled to develop a rule about the effect of state court decisions for federal estate tax purposes.6 Freuler v.
Helvering7 and Blair v. United States8 indicated that state court decrees
about property rights should control if the state court had proper jurisdiction and the proceeding was not “collusive.”9 However, what constituted “collusion” was not clear, with some courts opining that nonadversary decisions aimed at reducing tax were suspect,10 while others
gave more weight to the binding effect of the state court decree on the
taxpayer,11 suggesting that collusion required some kind of fraud.12
Thus the Tax Court in Bosch justifiably observed, “the law in this field is
highly confusing.”13 However, based on the New York ruling, the Tax
Court allowed the marital deduction, relying on several factors, including that the New York court had jurisdiction over the parties and its
decision was final and binding upon them.14 The Second Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the New York court had “authoritatively determined the [wife’s] rights under state law.”15
4 Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. at 458; see I.R.C. § 2056(b)(6). The situation would be
different today under the so-called QTIP rules of I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7).
5 Comm’r v. Estate of Bosch, 363 F.2d 1009, 1010-11 (2d Cir. 1966), rev’d, 387 U.S.
456.
6 For extensive analysis of pre-Bosch law, see Paul L. Caron, The Role of Federal
State Court Decisions in Federal Tax Litigation: Bosch, Erie and Beyond, 71 OR. L. REV.
781, 816 (1992) and Gilbert Paul Verbit, State Court Decisions in Federal Transfer Tax
Litigation: Bosch Revisited, 23 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 407, 431 (1988).
7 291 U.S. 35 (1934).
8 300 U.S. 5 (1937).
9 Frueler, 291 U.S. at 47; Blair, 300 U.S. at 10.
10 See, e.g., Stephenson v. United States, 241 F. Supp. 402, 403-04 (W.D. N.Y. 1965).
11 See, e.g., Estate of Faulkerson v. United States, 301 F.2d 231, 232 (7th Cir. 1962).
12 See Gallagher v. Smith, 223 F. 2d 218, 225 (3d Cir. 1955); Saulsbury v. United
States, 199 F.2d 578, 580 (5th Cir. 1952).
13 Estate of Bosch v. Comm’r, 43 T.C. 120, 122 (1964), rev’d, 382 F.2d 295 (2d Cir.
1967).
14 Id. at 123-24. The Tax Court also observed that the NY Supreme Court has precedential state law value, the Commissioner was aware of the suit, it was a reasoned opinion, and it had prospective tax consequences.
15 Comm’r v. Estate of Bosch, 363 F.2d 1009, 1015 (2d Cir. 1966), rev’d, 387 U.S. 456
(1967). But see id. at 1018 (Friendly, J., dissenting) (urging the adversary test).
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The Supreme Court reviewed what it characterized as three circuit
court positions about the effect of state court adjudications on federal
estate tax liability:
• If the state court decision is binding on the parties, it controls in
determining the federal estate tax result.
• The state court decision controls only if the federal court independently concludes it is consistent with state law as determined
by the state’s highest court.
• The state court decision controls only if it is the result of an adversary proceeding (the Commissioner’s litigating position).
The Supreme Court essentially adopted the second position, holding that, absent a decision of the state’s highest court, “federal authorities must apply what they find to be the state law after giving ‘proper
regard’ to relevant rulings of other courts of the State. In this respect it
may be said, in effect, to be sitting as a state court.”16 The Court relied
on both the Erie doctrine17 and the legislative history and purpose of
the marital deduction to support its holding. Indeed, the phrase “proper
regard” comes from the Senate Finance Committee report,18 and the
Court’s reasoning suggests that it saw deference to a lower state court
decision as less appropriate where a federal tax statute was involved
than in a classic Erie diversity case. The Court hoped its holding would
eliminate the need for extensive factual inquires, stating, “We believe
this would avoid much of the uncertainty that would result from the
‘non-adversary’ approach and at the same time would be fair to the taxpayer and protect the federal revenue as well.”19
Despite the Supreme Court’s desire to avoid “uncertainty,” federal
courts have incorporated additional variables, including continued consideration of “adversary-ness,” complicating the Bosch analysis.20 However, the core Bosch holding is well established and overall precludes
taxpayer reliance on lower state court decisions for federal estate tax
16

Comm’r v. Estate of Bosch 387 U.S. 456, 465 (1967).
Id.; see Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938).
18 S. REP. NO. 80-1013, pt. 2, at 4 (1948).
19 Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. at 465.
20 See, e.g., Estate of Warren v. Comm’r, 981 F.2d 776, 784 (5th Cir. 1993) (Texas
probate court decision approving settlement of bona fide adversarial dispute respected
for charitable deduction purposes, relevance of state court judgment depends on particular tax statute and nature of state proceeding); Estate of Palumbo v. United States, 788 F.
Supp. 2d 384, 394 (W.D. Pa. 2011) (taxpayer’s motion for summary judgment granted,
settlement agreement for charitable deduction); Estate of Hubert v. Comm’r, 101 T.C.
314 (1993) (settlement of will contest); Estate of Aronson v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2003189, 85 T.C.M. (CCH) 1561 (2003) (consent decree); Shirley Kovar, Adversity After
Bosch, 28 ACTEC J. 88, 94 (2002).
17
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purposes. That obviously makes it harder to construe or reform documents to achieve dependable tax results.21 The Service has issued relevant private letter rulings in certain contexts, for example, applying
Ahmanson Foundation v. United States22 under the umbrella of Bosch to
accept court-approved settlements where it finds recognition of an enforceable claim.23 The Service has also accepted non-adversarial decisions (often reforming a trust for scrivener’s error) under Bosch where
sufficient proof was furnished that state law supports the court’s action.24 The final regulations under section 2053 also may represent a
“relaxing” of Bosch as they provide, “if a court of competent jurisdiction . . . reviews and approves expenditures . . . a final judicial decision in
that matter may be relied upon to establish the amount of the claim or
expense . . . provided that the court actually passes upon the facts on
which deductibility depends.”25
Some taxpayers have successfully obtained approval of a state’s
highest court to satisfy Bosch.26 In practice it also seems that federal
courts, while reciting the Bosch test, will typically follow the decision of
an intermediate appellate state court.27
In Revenue Ruling 73-142,28 decedent created a discretionary family trust reserving the power to remove and replace trustees (including
naming himself). A lower state court in a non-adversary proceeding decreed that the trust allowed the decedent to remove and replace the
21 See Richard Barnes, Repairing Broken Trusts and other Fallen Estate Plans, 41
EST. PLAN. 3, 8 (2014); Diana Zeydel, Developing Law on Changing Irrevocable Trusts:
Staying Out of the Danger Zone, 47 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 1, 24 (2012); F. Ladson
Boyle, When It’s Broke, Fix It: Reforming Irrevocable Trusts to Change Tax Consequences, 53 TAX LAW. 821 (2000). As these articles discuss, state court reformations may
themselves create adverse tax consequences.
22 674 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1981).
23 See, e.g., PLR 201532013 (Dec. 8, 2014). Not precedent under I.R.C.
§ 6110(k)(3).
24 See, e.g., PLR 201521002 (Nov. 12, 2015); PLR 201442046 (June 18, 2014); PLR
201147010 (Aug. 17, 2011).
25 Jonathan G. Blattmachr, Mitchell M. Gans & Diana S.C. Zeydel, Final Regs. On
Deducting Expenses and Claims Under Section 2053 – Part 1, 37 EST. PLAN. 3, 9 (2010).
26 See, e.g., In re Paul F. Suhr Trust, No. 102, 230, 2010 Kan. Unpub. LEXIS 1, *1011 (Kan. Sup. Ct. Jan. 15, 2010) (reformation approved by trial court affirmed by highest
Kansas court); First Union Nat’l Bank of S.C. v. Cisa, 361 S.E.2d 615, 618 (S.C. 1987)
(appeal of declaratory judgment to highest state court). But see Bank of Am. v. Babcock,
18 N.E.3d 348, 350 (Mass. 2014) (declaration not appropriate for consideration). In TAM
8346008 (Aug. 4, 1983), the I.R.S. argued a decision of Georgia’s highest court was not
binding because it did not determine property rights within the meaning of Bosch.
27 See, e.g., Estate of Starkey v. United States, 233 F.3d 694, 699 (7th Cir. 2000);
Estate of Swallen v. Comm’r, 98 F.3d 919, 923 (6th Cir. 1996); Estate of Posner v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2004-112, 87 T.C.M. (CCH) 1288 (2004).
28 Rev. Rul. 73-142, 1973-1 C.B. 405.
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trustee only once, and precluded naming himself as trustee. The decedent then removed the trustee and named a new trustee, which under
the court’s decree extinguished any retained power. The ruling states,
“it appears that the decree is contrary to the decisions of the highest
court of the state.”29 Nonetheless the ruling concludes because, unlike
Bosch, the decree was handed down “before the time of the event giving
rise to the tax (that is, the date of the grantor’s death),” the decree controlled once it was issued and the time for appeal expired.30 In both
planning and administration, Revenue Ruling 73-142 may prove
valuable.31
Under the current state of the law the Bosch result is a rational one
and seems to avoid most gaming of state courts. The government might
consider allowing reformations for marital deduction and other tax qualifying purposes, as it does for split interest charitable trusts under section 2055(e)(3), which would avoid the Service’s concern about being
whipsawed and also reduce litigation.

29

Id.
Id.; cf. Estate of Rapp v. Comm’r, 140 F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 1998) (taxpayer
unsuccessfully tried to rely on Rev. Rul. 73-142, arguing that date of QTIP election,
rather than date of death, was measuring date).
31 For example, in determining whether a trustee is authorized under state law or
the governing instrument to deem within the meaning of Treas. Reg. § 1.643(a)-3(e) a
distribution of corpus as consisting of capital gain (and thereby be reportable by the
beneficiary rather than the trust), a lower court decision obtained before the distribution
occurs should be binding for federal tax purposes.
30

